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Abstract—A new achievability rate region for the secure dis-
crete memoryless Multiple-Access-Channel (MAC) is presented.
Thereafter, a novel secure coding scheme is proposed to achieve
a positive Secure Degrees-of-Freedom (S-DoF) in the single-
antenna MAC. This scheme converts the single-antenna system
into a multiple-dimension system with fractional dimensions. The
achievability scheme is based on the alignment of signals into
a small sub-space at the eavesdropper, and the simultaneous
separation of the signals at the intended receiver. Tools from
the field of Diophantine Approximation in number theory are
used to analyze the probability of error in the coding scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information theoretic secrecy in communi-
cation systems was first introduced in [1]. The information
theoretic secrecy requires that the received signal of the eaves-
dropper does not provide any information about the transmitted
messages. Following the pioneering works of [2] and [3] which
studied the wiretap channel, many multi-user channel models
have been considered from a perfect secrecy point of view.
The secure Gaussian multiple-access-channel with an external
eavesdropper is introduced in [4], [5]. This channel consists
of an ordinary Gaussian MAC and an external eavesdropper.
The capacity region of this channel is still an open problem in
the information theory field. For this channel, an achievable
rate scheme based on Gaussian codebooks is proposed in [4],
where also the sum secrecy capacity of the degraded Gaussian
channel is also found.
On the other hand, it is shown that the random coding
argument may be insufficient to prove capacity theorems
for certain channels; instead, structure codes can be used to
construct efficient channel codes for Gaussian channels. In
reference [6], nested lattice codes are used to provide secrecy
in two-user Gaussian channels. In [6] it is shown that structure
codes can achieve a positive S-DoF in a two-user MAC.
Especially, the achievability scheme of [6] provides a S-DoF
of 12 for a small category of channel gains and for the other
categories, it provides a S-DoF of strictly less than 12 .
In reference [7], the concept of interference alignment is
introduced and has illustrated its capability in achieving the
full DoF of a class of two-user X channels. In reference [8],
a novel coding scheme applicable in networks with single
antenna nodes is proposed. This scheme converts a single
antenna system into an equivalent Multiple Input Multiple
Output (MIMO) system with fractional dimensions. In this
work we use the notion of real alignment of [8] to prove
that for almost all channel gains in the secure K user single-
antenna Gaussian MAC, we can achieve the S-DoF of K−1
K
.
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The scheme of this work differs from that of [6], in the sense
that our scheme achieves the S-DoF of 12 for almost all channel
gains.Therefore, the carve of S-DoF versus channel gains is
almost certainly constant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides some background and preliminaries. In section III,
we present our results for the achievable S-DoF of the single-
antenna MAC. Finally, section IV concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a secure K-user Gaussian single-antenna Multiple-
Access-Channel (MAC). In this confidential setting, each user
k (k ∈ K △= {1, 2, ...,K}) wishes to send the message Wk to
the intended receiver in n uses of the channel, simultaneously
and prevent the eavesdropper from having any information
about the messages. At a specific time, the signals received
by the intended receiver and the eavesdropper is given by
Y=
K∑
k=1
hkXk + W˜1 (1)
Z=
K∑
k=1
hk,eXk + W˜2,
where Xk for k ∈ K is a real input scalar under an input
average power constraint. We require that E[X2k ] ≤ P , Y
and Z be real output scalars which are received by the
destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, hk and hk,e for
k = 1, 2, ...,K are fixed, real scalars which model the channel
gains between the transmitters and the intended receiver and
the eavesdropper, respectively. The channel state information
is assumed to be known perfectly at all the transmitters and at
all receivers, and W˜1, W˜2 are real Gaussian random variables
with zero means and unit variances. Let Xnk , Y n and Zn
denote the random channel inputs and random channel outputs
over a block of n samples. Furthermore, let W˜n1 , and W˜n2
denote the additive noises of the channels. The elements of
W˜n1 and W˜n2 are independent zero mean Gaussian random
variables with unit variances. In addition, W˜n1 and W˜n2 are
independent of Xnk ’s and Wk’s. A ((2nR1 , 2nR2 , ..., 2nRk), n)
secret code for the above channel consists of the following
components:
1) K secret message sets Wk = {1, 2, ..., 2nRk}.
2) K stochastic encoding functions fk(.) which map the se-
cret messages to the transmitted symbols, i.e., fk : wk → Xnk
for each wk ∈ Wk. At encoder k, each codeword is designed
according to the transmitter’s average power constraint P .
3) A decoding function φ(.) which maps the received
symbols to estimate the messages: φ(Y n)→ (Wˆ1, ..., WˆK).
The reliability of the transmission is measured by the
average probability of error, which is defined as the probability
that the decoded messages are not equal to the transmitted
messages; that is
P (n)e =
1∏K
k=1 2
nRk
∑
(w1,...,wK)∈W1×....×WK
(2)
P {φ (Y n) 6= (w1, ..., wK) | (w1, ..., wk) is sent} .
The secrecy level is measured by a normalized equivocation,
defined as follows: The normalized equivocation for each
subset of messages WS for S ⊆ K is
∆S
△
=
H(WS |Zn)
H(WS)
. (3)
The rate-equivocation tuple (R1, ..., RK , d) is said to be
achievable for the Gaussian single-antenna multiple-access-
channel with confidential messages, if for any ǫ > 0, there
exists a sequence of ((2nR1 , ..., 2nRK ), n) secret codes, such
that for sufficiently large n,
P (n)e ≤ ǫ, (4)
and
∆S ≥ d− ǫ, ∀S ⊆ K. (5)
The perfect secrecy rate tuple (R1, ..., RK) is said to be
achievable when d = 1. When all the transmitted messages
are perfectly secure, we have
∆K ≥ 1− ǫ, (6)
In [5] it is shown that when all of the K messages are perfectly
secure, then it guarantees that any subset of the messages
become perfectly secure.
The total Secure Degrees-of Freedom (S-DoF) of η is said to
be achievable if the rate-equivocation tuple (R1, ..., RK , d =
1) is achievable, and
η = lim
P→∞
∑K
k=1Rk
1
2 logP
(7)
III. S-DOF OF THE SINGLE-ANTENNA MAC
In this section, we consider the achievable S-DoF of the
Gaussian single-antenna multiple-access-channel under the
perfect secrecy constraint. In order to satisfy the perfect
secrecy constraint, we use the random binning coding scheme
to generate the codebooks. To maximize the achievable de-
grees of freedom, we adopt the signal alignment scheme used
in [8] to separate the signals at the intended receiver and
simultaneously align the signals into a small subspace at the
eavesdropper. The main results of this section are presented
in the following theorems. First, we present an achievable
secrecy rate region for the discrete memoryless multiple-
access-channel.
Theorem 1: For the perfectly secure discrete memoryless
multiple-access-channel of P (y, z|x1, ..., xK), the region of{
(R1, ..., RK)|
∑
i∈S
Ri ≤ I(US ;Y |USc), ∀S ⊂ K, (8)∑
k∈K
Rk ≤ [I(UK;Y )− I(UK;Z)]
+
}
,
for any distribution of
P (u1)P (u2)....P (uK)P (x1|u1)P (x2|u2)...P (xK |uK)
×P (y, z|x1, ..., xK),
is achievable.
Proof: The proof is available in the Appendix.
Reference [5] derived an achievable rate region with Gaus-
sian codebooks and power control for the degraded Gaus-
sian secure multiple-access-channel, when all the transmitters
and receivers are equipped with a single antenna. Theorem
1, however, gives an achievability secrecy rate region for
the general discrete memoryless multiple-access-channel. Our
achievability rate region is also larger than the region of [5]
in a special case of the Gaussian degraded case. When the
transmitters and receivers are equipped with a single antenna,
the total achieved S-DoF by using Gaussian codebooks is
0. Here, we will provide a coding scheme based on integer
codebooks, and show that for almost all channel gains a
positive total S-DoF is achievable. The following theorem
illustrates our results.
Theorem 2: For the Gaussian single antenna multiple-
access-channel, a total K−1
K
secure degrees-of-freedom can
be achieved for almost all channel gains.
Proof: Let us define X˜k △= hk,eA Xk and h˜k
△
= hk
hk,e
.
Without loss of generality let us assume that h˜K = 1; the
cannel model then is equivalent as follows:
Y= A
[
K−1∑
k=1
h˜kX˜k + X˜K
]
+ W˜1 (9)
Z= A
K∑
k=1
X˜k + W˜2,
where, A2E[X˜2k ] ≤ P˜
△
= h2k,eP . In this model we say that
the signals are aligned at the eavesdropper, according to the
following definition:
Definition 1: The signals X˜1, X˜2,...,X˜K are said to be
aligned at a receiver if its received signal is a rational combi-
nation of them.
Note that, in n-dimensional Euclidean spaces (n ≥ 2), two sig-
nals are aligned when they are received in the same direction
at the receiver. In general, m signals are aligned at a receiver if
they span a subspace with a dimension less than m. The above
definition, however, generalizes the concept of alignment for
the one-dimensional real numbers. Our coding scheme is based
on integer codebooks, which means that X˜k ∈ Z for all k ∈ K.
If some integer signals are aligned at a receiver, then their
effect is similar to a single signal at high SNR regimes. This
is due to the fact that rational numbers form a filed; therefore
the sum of constellations from Q form a constellation in Q
with an enlarged cardinality.
Before we present our achievability scheme, we need to
define the rational dimension of a set of real numbers.
Definition 2: (Rational Dimension) The rational dimension
of a set of real numbers {h˜1, h˜2, ..., h˜K−1, h˜K = 1} is M if
there exists a set of real numbers {g1, g2, ..., gM}, such that
each h˜k can be represented as a rational combination of gis,
i.e., h˜k = ak,1g1+ak,2g2+ ...+ak,MgM , where ak,i ∈ Q for
all k ∈ K and i ∈ M.
In fact, the rational dimension of a set of channel gains is
the effective dimension seen at the corresponding receiver. In
particular, {h˜1, h˜2, ..., h˜K} are rationally independent if the
rational dimension is K , i.e., none of the h˜k can be represented
as the rational combination of other numbers.
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Note that all of the channel gains h˜k are generated inde-
pendently with a distribution. From the number theory, it is
known that the set of all possible channel gains that are ratio-
nally independent has a Lebesgue measure 1. Therefore, we
can assume that {h˜1, h˜2, ..., h˜K} are rationally independent,
almost surely. Our achievability coding scheme is as follows:
1) Encoding: Each transmitter limits its input symbols
to a finite set, which is called the transmit constellation.
Even though it has access to the continuum of real numbers,
restriction to a finite set has the benefit of easy and feasible
decoding at the intended receiver. The transmitter k selects a
constellation Vk to send message Wk. The constellation points
are chosen from integer points, i.e., Vk ⊂ Z. We assume that
Vk is a bounded set. Hence, there is a constant Qk such that
Vk ⊂ [−Qk, Qk]. The cardinality of Vk which limits the rate
of message Wk is denoted by ‖Vk‖.
Having formed the constellation, the transmitter k constructs
a random codebook for message Wk with rate Rk. This can
be accomplished by choosing a probability distribution on the
input alphabets. The uniform distribution is the first candidate
and it is selected for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, the
stochastic encoder k generates 2n(I(X˜k;Y |X˜(K−k)c )+ǫk) inde-
pendent and identically distributed sequences x˜nk according
to the distribution P (x˜nk ) =
∏n
i=1 P (x˜k,i), where P (x˜k,i)
denotes the probability distribution function of the uniformly
distributed random variable x˜k,i over Vk. Next, these se-
quences are randomly distributed into 2nRk bins. Index each
of the bins by wk ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nRk}.
For each user k ∈ K, to send message wk, the transmitter
looks for a x˜nk in bin wk. The rates are such that there exist
more than one x˜nk . The transmitter randomly chooses one of
them and sends xnk = A
x˜nk
hk,e
. The parameter A controls the
input power.
2) Decoding: At a specific time, the received signal at the
legitimate receiver is as follows:
Y = A
[
h˜1X˜1 + h˜2X˜2 + ...+ h˜K−1X˜K−1 + X˜K
]
+ W˜1
The legitimate receiver passes the received signal
Y through a hard decoder. The hard decoder
looks for a point Y˜ in the received constellation
Vr = A
[
h˜1V1 + h˜2V2 + ...+ h˜K−1VK−1 + VK
]
which
is the nearest point to the received signal Y . Therefore, the
continuous channel changes to a discrete one in which the
input symbols are taken from the transmit constellations Vk
and the output symbols belonging to the received constellation
Vr. h˜k’s are rationally independent. This means that the
equation A
[
h˜1X1 + h˜2X2 + ...+ h˜K−1XK−1 +XK
]
= 0
has no rational solution. This property implies that any real
number vr belonging to the constellation Vr is uniquely
decomposable as vr = A
∑K
k=1 h˜k
̂˜
Xk. Note that if there
exists another possible decomposition v˜r = A
∑K
k=1 h˜k
̂˜
X
′
k,
then h˜k’s have to be rationally-dependent, which is a
contradiction. We refer to this property as property Γ. This
property in fact implies that if there is no additive noise in
the channel, then the receiver can decode all the transmitted
signals with zero error probability.
Remark 1: In a random environment, it is easy to show
that the set of channel gains which are rationally-dependent
has a measure of zero, with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
Therefore, Property Γ is satisfied almost surely.
3) Error Probability Analysis: Let dmin denote the mini-
mum distance in the received constellation Vr. Having prop-
erty Γ, the receiver can decode the transmitted signals. Let Vr
and Vˆr be the transmitted and decoded symbols, respectively.
The probability of error i.e., Pe = P (Vˆr 6= Vr), is bounded as
follows:
Pe ≤ Q(
dmin
2
) ≤ exp(−
d2min
8
) (10)
where Q(x) = 1√
2π
∫∞
x
exp(− t
2
2 )dt. Note that finding dmin is
generally not easy. Using Khintchine and Groshev theorems,
however, it is possible to lower bound the minimum distance.
Here we explain some backgrounds to use the theorems of
Khintchine and Groshev.
The field of Diophantine approximation in number theory
deals with approximation of real numbers with rational num-
bers. The reader is referred to [9], [10] and the references
therein. The Khintchine theorem is one of the cornerstones in
this field. This theorem provides a criteria for a given function
ψ : N → R+ and real number h, such that |p+ h˜q| < ψ(|q|)
has either infinitely many solutions or at most finitely many
solutions for (p, q) ∈ Z2. Let A(ψ) denote the set of real
numbers, such that |p+ h˜q| < ψ(|q|) has an infinite number of
solutions in integers. The theorem has two parts. The first part
is the convergent part and states that if ψ(|q|) is convergent,
i.e.,
∞∑
q=1
ψ(q) <∞ (11)
then A(ψ) has a measure of zero with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. This part can be rephrased in more convenient way,
as follows: For almost all real numbers, |p + h˜q| > ψ(|q|)
holds for all (p, q) ∈ Z2 except for a finite number of them.
Since the number of integers violating the inequality is finite,
one can find a constant c such that
|p+ h˜q| > cψ(|q|) (12)
holds for all integers p and q, almost surely. The divergent
part of the theorem states that A(ψ) has the full measure,
i.e. the set R−A(ψ) has measure of zero provided that ψ is
decreasing and ψ(|q|) is divergent, i.e.,
∞∑
q=1
ψ(q) =∞. (13)
There is an extension to Khintchines theorem which regards
the approximation of linear forms. Let h˜ = (h˜1, h˜2, ..., h˜K−1)
and q = (q1, q2, ..., qK−1) denote (K−1)-tuples in RK−1 and
ZK−1, respectively. Let AK−1(ψ) denote the set of (K − 1)-
tuple real numbers h˜ such that
|p+ q1h˜1 + q2h˜2 + ...+ qK−1h˜K−1| < ψ(|q|∞) (14)
has infinitely many solutions for p ∈ Z and q ∈ ZK−1. Here,
|q|∞ is the supreme norm of q which is defined as maxk |qk|.
The following theorem illustrates the Lebesgue measure of the
set AK−1(ψ).
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Theorem 3: (Khintchine-Groshev) Let ψ : N→ R+. Then,
the set AK−1(ψ) has a measure of zero provided that
∞∑
q=1
qK−2ψ(q) <∞ (15)
and has the full measure if
∞∑
q=1
qK−2ψ(q) =∞ and ψ is monotonic (16)
In this paper, we are interested in the convergent part of the
theorem. Moreover, given an arbitrary ǫ > 0 the function
ψ(q) = 1
qK−1+ǫ
satisfies the condition of (15). In fact, the
convergent part of the above theorem can be stated as follows:
For almost all K − 1-tuple real numbers h˜ there exists a
constant c, such that
|p+ q1h˜1 + q2h˜2 + ...+ qK−1h˜K−1| >
c
(maxk |qk|)K−1+ǫ
holds for all p ∈ Z and q ∈ ZK−1. The Khintchine-
Groshev theorem can be used to bound the minimum dis-
tance of points in the received constellation Vr. In fact,
a point in the received constellation has a linear form of
vr = A
[
h˜1v1 + h˜2v2 + ...+ h˜K−1vK−1 + vK
]
. Therefore,
we can conclude that
dmin >
Ac
(maxk∈{1,2,...,K−1}Qk)K−1+ǫ
. (17)
The probability of error in hard decoding, see (10), can be
bounded as:
Pe < exp
(
−
(Ac)2
8(maxk∈{1,2,...,K−1}Qk)2K−2+2ǫ
)
(18)
Let us assume that Qk for all k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K − 1} is Q =
⌊P˜
1−ǫ
2(K+ǫ) ⌋. Moreover, since E[X˜2k ] ≤ A2Q2k ≤ P˜ , we can
choose A = P˜
K−1+2ǫ
2(K+ǫ)
. Substituting in (18) yields
Pe < exp(−
c2
8
P˜ ǫ). (19)
Thus, Pe → 0 when P˜ →∞ or equivalently P →∞.
4) Equivocation Calculation: Since the equivocation analy-
sis of Theorem 1 is valid for any input distribution, the integer
inputs satisfy the perfect secrecy constraint.
5) S-DoF Calculation: The maximum achievable sum rate
is as follows:∑
k∈K
Rk= I(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K ;Y )− I(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K ;Z) (20)
= H(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K |Z)−H(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K |Y )
(a)
≥ H(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K |Z)− 1− Pe log ‖X˜ ‖
(b)
≥ H(X˜1, X˜2, ..., X˜K |
∑
k∈K
X˜k)− 1− Pe log ‖X˜ ‖
(c)
=
∑
k∈K
H(X˜k)−H(
∑
k∈K
X˜k)− 1− Pe log ‖X˜ ‖
(d)
= K log(2Q+ 1)− log(2KQ+ 1)− 1− Pe log ‖X˜ ‖,
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from the
fact that conditioning always decreases entropy, (c) follows
from chain rule, and (d) follows from the fact that X˜k has
uniform distribution over Vk = [−Q,Q]. The S-DoF can
therefore be computed as follows:
η = lim
P→∞
∑
k∈KRk
1
2 logP
=
(K − 1)(1− ǫ)
K + ǫ
(21)
Since ǫ can be arbitrary small, then η = K−1
K
is indeed
achievable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unlike [6], we presented a coding scheme that can achieve
the total amount of K−1
K
S-DoF for the K user secure MAC
for almost all channel gains. Our scheme is based on a single
layer integer coding and random binning.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
1) Codebook Generation: The structure of the encoder for
user k ∈ K is as follows: Fix P (uk) and P (xk|uk). The
stochastic encoder k generates 2n(I(Uk;Y |U(K−k)c )+ǫk) inde-
pendent and identically distributed sequences unk according
to the distribution P (unk ) =
∏n
i=1 P (uk,i). Next, randomly
distribute these sequences into 2nRk bins. Index each of the
bins by wk ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nRk}.
2) Encoding: For each user k ∈ K, to send message wk,
the transmitter looks for a unk in bin wk . The rates are such
that there exist more than one unk . The transmitter randomly
chooses one of them and then generates xnk according to
P (xnk |u
n
k) =
∏n
i=1 P (xk,i|uk,i) and sent it.
3) Decoding: The received signals at the legitimate receiver,
yn, is the output of the channel P (yn|xnK) =
∏n
i=1 P (yi|xK,i).
The legitimate receiver looks for the unique sequence unK such
that (unK, yn) is jointly typical and declares the indices of the
bins containing unk as the messages received.
4) Error Probability Analysis: Since the region of (8) is a
subset of the capacity region of the multiple-access-channel
without secrecy constraint, then the error probability analysis
is straightforward and omitted here.
5) Equivocation Calculation: To satisfy the perfect secrecy
constraint, we need to prove the requirement of (6). From
H(WK|Zn) we have
H(WK|Zn)= H(WK, Zn)−H(Zn) (22)
= H(WK, UnK, Z
n)−H(UnK|WK, Z
n)
−H(Zn)
= H(WK, UnK) +H(Z
n|WK, UnK)
−H(UnK|WK, Z
n)−H(Zn)
(a)
≥ H(WK, UnK) +H(Z
n|WK, UnK)− nǫn
−H(Zn)
(b)
= H(WK, UnK) +H(Z
n|UnK)− nǫn −H(Z
n)
(c)
≥ H(UnK) +H(Z
n|UnK)− nǫn −H(Z
n)
= H(UnK)− I(U
n
K;Z
n)− nǫn
(d)
≥ I(UnK;Y
n)− I(UnK;Z
n)− nǫn
(e)
≥ n
∑
k∈K
Rk − nǫn − nδ1n − nδ4n
= H(WK)− nǫn − nδ1n − nδ4n,
4
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, which states that for
sufficiently large n, H(UnK|WK, Zn) ≤ h(P
(n)
we ) +nPnweRw ≤
nǫn. Here Pnwe denotes the wiretapper’s error probability of
decoding unK in the case that the bin numbers wK are known
to the eavesdropper and Rw = I(UK;Z). Since the sum rate
is small enough, then Pnwe → 0 for sufficiently large n. (b)
follows from the following Markov chain: WK → UnK → Zn.
Hence, we have H(Zn|WK, UnK) = H(Zn|UnK). (c) follows
from the fact that H(WK, UnK) ≥ H(UnK). (d) follows from
that fact that H(UnK) ≥ I(UnK;Y n). (e) follows from the
following lemma:
Lemma 1: Assume UnK, Y n and Zn are generated according
to the achievability scheme of Theorem 1 we then have,
nI(UK;Y )− nδ1n ≤ I(UnK;Y
n) ≤ nI(UK;Y ) + nδ2n
nI(UK;Z)− nδ3n ≤ I(UnK;Z
n) ≤ nI(UK;Z) + nδ4n,
where, δ1n, δ2n, δ3n, δ4n → 0 when n→∞.
Proof: Let A(n)ǫ (PUK,Z) denote the set of typical se-
quences (unK, zn) with respect to PUK,Z , and
ζ =
{
1, (unK, z
n) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ
0, otherwise (23)
be the corresponding indicator function. We expand
I(UnK;Z
n, ζ) and I(UnK, ζ;Zn) as follows:
I(UnK;Z
n, ζ)= I(UnK;Z
n) + I(UnK; ζ|Z
n) (24)
= I(UnK; ζ) + I(U
n
K;Z
n|ζ),
and
I(UnK, ζ;Z
n)= I(UnK;Z
n) + I(ζ;Zn|UnK) (25)
= I(ζ;Zn) + I(UnK;Z
n|ζ).
Therefore, we have
I(UnK;Z
n|ζ) − I(UnK; ζ|Z
n)≤ I(UnK;Z
n) (26)
≤ I(UnK;Z
n|ζ) + I(ζ;Zn).
Note that I(ζ;Zn) ≤ H(ζ) ≤ 1 and I(UnK; ζ|Zn) ≤
H(ζ|Zn) ≤ H(ζ) ≤ 1. Thus, the above inequality implies
that
1∑
j=0
P (ζ = j)I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = j)− 1 ≤ I(UnK;Z
n) (27)
≤
1∑
j=0
P (ζ = j)I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = j) + 1.
According to the joint typicality property, we have
0≤ P (ζ = 1)I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = 1) (28)
≤ nP ((unK, z
n) ∈ A(n)ǫ (PUK,Z)) log ‖Z‖
≤ nǫn log ‖Z‖.
Now consider the term P (ζ = 0)I(UnK;Zn|ζ = 0). Following
the sequence joint typicality properties, we have
(1 − ǫn)I(U
n
K;Z
n|ζ = 0)≤ P (ζ = 0)I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = 0)
≤ I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = 0), (29)
where
I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = 0) =
∑
(un
K
,zn)∈A(n)ǫ
P (unK, z
n) log
P (unK, z
n)
P (unK)P (zn)
.
Since H(UK, Z)−ǫn ≤ − 1n logP (u
n
K, z
n) ≤ H(UK, Z)+ǫn,
then we have,
n [−H(UK, Z) +H(UK) +H(Z)− 3ǫn] ≤ I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = 0)
≤ n [−H(UK, Z) +H(UK) +H(Z) + 3ǫn] ,
or equivalently,
n [I(UK;Z)− 3ǫn]≤ I(UnK;Z
n|ζ = 0) (30)
≤ n [I(UK;Z) + 3ǫn] .
By substituting (30) into (29) and then substituting (29) and
(28) into (27), we get the desired result,
nI(UK;Z)− nδ1n ≤ I(UnK;Z
n) ≤ nI(UK;Z) + nδ2n,
where
δ1n = ǫnI(UK;Z) + 3(1− ǫn)ǫn +
1
n
(31)
δ2n = 3ǫn + ǫn log ‖Z‖+
1
n
.
Following the same steps, one can prove the second inequality.
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